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The structure of complex networks in previous research has been widely described as scale-free
networks generated by the preferential attachment model. However, the preferential attachment
model does not take into account the detailed topological property observed in real networks. Here
we propose the models of scale-free networks which can reproduce the topological assortativity of real
networks. With an identical degree distribution and network size, we study the structural robustness
and fragility as well as the dynamic change of load intensity when nodes are successively removed
under random and various intentional attack strategies. We find that disassortative networks are
structurally robust against random attacks and highly load-tolerant, while assortative networks are
most resistant to intentional attacks yet significantly fragile against random attacks.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc, 64.60.Ak, 05.90.+m
I. INTRODUCTION
Many complex systems such as the Internet, electric
circuits, and biological cells can retain their functions
despite strong perturbations. The robustness of these
systems is often attributed to underlying heterogeneous
network structure: only a few nodes called hubs have a
large number of edges, but the majority of nodes have
a few edges. Those structures are called scale-free net-
works, where the degree distribution P (k), the probabil-
ity a node has k edges, decays as a power-law P (k) ∝ k−γ
[1, 2].
The existing studies of network robustness mainly fo-
cus on preservation of connectivity against successive at-
tacks of node removal. Callaway et al. [3] and Co-
hen et al. [4, 5] have analytically calculated the criti-
cal thresholds at which networks break apart under both
random and intentional attacks based on percolation the-
ory. However, their methods are applicable when cycles,
closed paths with no other repeated nodes than the start-
ing and ending nodes, can be ignored. Most of the real
networks are highly clustered and contain many cycles;
therefore, their critical thresholds have usually been de-
rived by computational simulations [6, 7, 8]. The cur-
rent consensus on the connectivity robustness in com-
plex networks is that, as compared to random networks,
scale-free networks are robust against random failures,
yet fragile against intentional attacks on hubs [9, 10]. It
has been also reported that the attack strategy based on
betweenness centrality much harms network connectivity
[11]. These results are obtained with scale-free networks
created through the preferential attachment rule [12], but
their inner structures do not reflect degree-degree cor-
relations observed in real networks [13]. As shown in
our recent paper [14], the traffic efficiency on scale-free
networks significantly varies depending on their degree-
degree correlations. Here we are interested in the effect of
inner structures on connectivity robustness in scale-free
networks.
Our interest also lies in the dynamic change of load in-
tensity caused by traffic flows on scale-free networks. To
maintain the stability against heavy load attributed to
node removal, network structures should be highly load-
tolerant. Although it is known that the excess load tends
to cause the lethal avalanches of node breakdowns [15, 16]
and traffic congestion [17, 18, 19], little attention has
been paid to the effect of inner structures on load inten-
sity when networks are successively attacked. We thus
consider the load tolerance in addition to connectivity
robustness to evaluate the reliability of networks.
In this article, we introduce the models of scale-free
networks which take into account the topological assor-
tativity of real networks. With an identical degree distri-
bution and network size, we investigate the connectivity
robustness as well as the load tolerance when nodes are
successively removed under random and various inten-
tional attack strategies. From these analyses, we study
the relationship between inner structures and robustness
in scale-free networks.
II. METHODS
A. Network models
We introduce four models of scale-free network which
generate different topological characteristics. First we
construct a scale-free network with the preferential at-
tachment (PA) rule [12], which is a basic growth algo-
rithm to produce a network with a power-law degree dis-
tribution: starting with a small complete graph, each
new node with m edges is added and connected to dif-
ferent old nodes with probabilities proportional to their
degrees. To analyze the percolation properties of realistic
networks, the minimum degree kmin(= m) is two since we
cannot make cycle structures in the case ofm < 2. In ad-
dition, we employ the uncorrelated null (UN) model [20]
which generates a network by rewiring all edges randomly
2using the PA network. Both of the PA and UN networks
have non-assortative structures. While the PA networks
contain age correlations because of growing scheme of
network construction, the UN model can destroy all the
hidden correlations in the PA network.
We propose two other models which create scale-free
networks reproducing the inner structures of real net-
works. Our models change only assortative level of the
network with fixing the degree distribution P (k) of the
PA model. One of the models generates disassorta-
tive networks where high-degree nodes preferably con-
nect to low-degree nodes (HL). The other model gener-
ates the network with assortative topology where high-
degree nodes preferably connect to other high-degree
nodes (HH). First, based on the degree distribution
P (k), all nodes are labeled and arranged in a queue as
v1, v2, · · · , vN in descending order of their degrees. The
HL network is produced by the algorithm iterating the
following procedures: selecting node vi with the highest
degree ki from the head of the queue, linking edges be-
tween vi and ki nodes picked up randomly from the queue
(vi+1, · · · , vN ), and removing nodes fully connected from
the queue. Similarly, the HH network is produced by
the algorism of the HL model with replacing the sec-
ond procedure: linking edges between vi and ki nodes
picked up randomly from the queue depending on their
weights wi+1, · · · , wN (wj = k
n
j , n > 1). In this study,
we set n = 3 so that the absolute values of assortativity
of both the HL and HH networks become nearly equiva-
lent (see Table I). The topology produced by the HL
model is seen in biological networks and the Internet
[13, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25], whereas the topology produced
by the HH model is seen in social networks [13, 21, 26].
For reference, we also construct the random network
based on the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) model [2, 27] whose min-
imum degree is also two. All the networks in this study
have 1000 nodes and 2000 edges. In case a slight topo-
logical difference may change the results of analysis, the
results shown in this paper are averaged by 1000 trials.
Although these four types of scale-free networks have
the identical degree distribution, their topological prop-
erties are quite different. Fig.1 shows the local connec-
tivity of the node with the highest degree generated by
each network model. In the HL network, the nodes ad-
jacent to hubs have low degree. This means that there
are few direct edges between hubs. In contrast, the hub
in the HH network connects to other high-degree nodes.
Both of the PA and UN networks display the intermedi-
ate characteristics between the HL and HH networks.
B. Topological indices
We quantitatively evaluate the structural properties
of those networks with some topological indices. The
degree-degree correlation expresses the topological ten-
dency between the degree of a node and that of the near-
est neighbors, and it is evaluated with assortativity coef-
ficient [13, 21] expressed as
r =
M−1
∑
i jiki − [M
−1
∑
i
1
2
(ji + ki)]
2
M−1
∑
1
2
(j2i + k
2
i )− [M
−1
∑
i
1
2
(ji + ki)]2
, (1)
where ji and ki are the degree of the nodes at the end
of the ith edge, and M is the number of edges. The
assortativity r ranges between −1 ≤ r ≤ 1 depending on
the assortative level of the network.
The average path length L of a network is given by
L =
2
∑
i<j Lij
N(N − 1)
, (2)
where Lij is the shortest path length between node vi
and node vj , and N is the number of nodes.
The clustering characteristic of node vi is evaluated by
the clustering coefficient Ci expressed as
Ci =
2Ei
ki(ki − 1)
, (3)
where ki is the degree of node vi and Ei is the num-
ber of edges that exist between these ki nodes. The
average clustering coefficient of the network is given by
C =
∑
i Ci/N .
The betweenness centrality Bi of node vi is given by
Bi =
∑
s<t
σist
σst
, (4)
where σst is the total number of the shortest paths from
node vs to node vt and σ
i
st is the number of the shortest
paths from vs to vt passing through node vi. Nodes of
high betweenness centrality have a key role to shorten
the length of many paths between nodes in the network
[28, 29], and tend to have high load intensity [14, 30]. The
average betweenness centrality of the network is given by
B =
∑
iBi/N
The distribution of betweenness centrality is an impor-
tant factor to estimate the efficiency of traffic load on the
network [14, 17], and we thus evaluate the betweenness
deviation expressed as
δB =
√∑
i(Bi −B)
2
N
. (5)
The low betweenness deviation means that load on the
network is efficiently distributed, whereas the high be-
tweenness deviation means that load is concentrated in
a part of the network.
As shown in Table I, the HL model shows disassor-
tativity; that is, there are many edges between a hub
and a low-degree node. This disassortative character-
istic of the HL network slightly lengthens average path
length and lessens clustering characteristics compared to
the PA network. Furthermore, the betweenness devia-
tion of the HL network is significantly smaller than that
of the PA network. This means that the load on the
3HL network is efficiently distributed. Although the HH
network has the same power-law degree distribution, it
shows high assortativity and has the long average path
length. In addition, the average betweenness centrality of
the HH network is quite high. This indicates that there
are many bottlenecks in the HH network in the initial
state. In the PA and UN networks, r is nearly zero, indi-
cating non-assortativity; that is, their structures have no
degree-degree correlation. However, the characteristics
of L, B, and δB in the UN network are largely different
from those in the PA network. These differences indicate
that age correlation affects the topological characteristics
of network.
C. Attack strategies
The robustness of networks has been previously ana-
lyzed under the strategies of node attack at random or
in order of node’s degree [9]. In addition to the degree-
based attack, the betweenness-based attack also belongs
to an intentional harmful strategy. The order of these in-
tentional attacks can be determined with the initial dis-
tributions of degree or betweenness centrality. However,
as nodes are removed from the network, these distribu-
tions change accordingly. The order of nodes determined
by their initial degrees or betweenness centralities does
not usually coincide with the recalculated order after the
removal of nodes.
Given the variety of attack orders, the intentional
strategies are classified depending on whether they are
based on degree or betweenness centrality and whether
the order of node attack is determined statically or dy-
namically [11]. The static degree-based attack (SDA) is
the strategy that the target nodes are selected one by
one in descending order of their initial degrees. The dy-
namic degree-based attack (DDA) is the strategy that
the target nodes are dynamically selected by searching a
node with the highest degree at every removal step. In
the same way, we can also define the static betweenness-
based attack (SBA) and the dynamic betweenness-based
attack (DBA) which target the node with the highest be-
tweenness centrality. In addition to these strategies, we
adopt the random attack (RA) that the target nodes are
selected randomly. When a node is removed from net-
works, all edges connecting the node are also removed.
III. RESULTS
A. Connectivity robustness
To determine the critical threshold fc at which a net-
work is disrupted, we monitor the relative size S and the
average path length L of the largest connected compo-
nent in function of the fraction f of node removal, as
shown in Fig 2 and Fig 3. The fraction of node removal
represents f = m/N , where m is the number of removed
nodes and N is the number of nodes in the initial con-
nected network. S represents the fraction of nodes con-
tained in the largest connected component out of the N
nodes. As nodes are removed, S decreases from S = 1,
and gradually the network breaks into isolated clusters.
At S = 0 the network completely breaks apart. Mean-
while, as nodes are removed, L increases and peaks just
before the network is disrupted. After the network breaks
into isolated clusters, L decreases rapidly because the size
of the largest connected component decreases drastically.
In this study, the critical threshold fc is determined by
the fraction of removed nodes from the network when L
is maximum, instead of using the point S = 0, since small
isolated clusters do not work as a system anymore.
Table II shows the critical threshold fc under all the
attack strategies. Large fc indicates that the network is
robust in terms of connectivity. For all the network mod-
els, the order of harmful attack strategy is RA < SBA
< SDA < DDA < DBA (RA < SBA means that SBA
is more harmful than RA). The order of robust network
model is different whether the type of attack strategy is
random or intentional. Under the RA strategy, the or-
der of robust network is HH < ER < UN < PA < HL
(HH < ER means that ER is more robust than HH), but
under the four intentional strategies, it changes into PA
< UN < HL < HH < ER. From our numerical results,
we find that the HL network we proposed is structurally
more robust than the PA and UN networks under all the
attack strategies. It is surprising that the HH network is
much more fragile than the ER network against random
attacks although it is more robust than the HL network
against intentional attacks.
Under the RA strategy, all the network models display
the high robustness compared with the intentional attack
strategies. The critical threshold of the HL network is the
highest, and that of the HH network is quite low against
random attacks. The network in which hubs are kept
away from each other can further increase the robustness
against random attacks, whereas dense interconnections
between hubs make the network fragile.
Comparing the two static intentional attack strategies,
the SDA is more harmful than the SBA for all the net-
work models. Since the betweenness centrality depends
on the global network structure, the distribution of be-
tweenness centrality varies substantially as nodes are re-
moved from the network. Thus, the initial value of be-
tweenness centrality does not appropriately reflect the
importance of node after several nodes are removed from
the network.
The dynamic intentional attack strategies are more
harmful than the static ones. A large number of edges
are removed faster under the DDA strategy, while the
largest connected component is broken into isolated clus-
ters faster under the DBA strategy. As shown in Table
II, the most lethal attack strategy is the DBA. This re-
sult indicates that detecting the key nodes which connect
many clusters is the most effective way for network dis-
ruption.
4B. Load tolerance
To analyze the dynamic change of the amount of load
and its distribution, we also monitor the average node
betweenness centrality B and the betweenness deviation
δB of the largest connected component, as shown in Fig
4 and Fig 5. Table III shows the fraction fB of node
removal when the average betweenness centrality is max-
imum. The maximum values Bmax and betweenness de-
viation δBfB at fB are shown in Table IV and Table V
respectively.
Under the RA strategy, B for all the networks de-
creases monotonically as nodes are removed. δB for all
the scale-free networks also decreases, while δB for the
ER network keeps constant. Thus Bmax and δBfB un-
der the RA strategy are approximately the same as the
values in the initial state. This indicates that when ran-
dom failures occur, the amount of load on networks and
the degree of heterogeneity of load distribution do not
increase.
Under the intentional attack strategies, B for the UN,
HH, and PA networks increases rapidly as f increases,
and peaks at fB before the critical threshold fc. These
results indicate that the breakdowns of nodes make the
amount of load heavier when these networks are inten-
tionally attacked. After these networks break into iso-
lated clusters, the average betweenness centrality B de-
creases rapidly as well as the average path length L.
Betweenness deviation δB once drops by removal of a
few nodes. As nodes are removed, δB increases again,
and peaks near fB, indicating that the distribution of
betweenness becomes heterogeneous by successive inten-
tional attacks. The increase in the heterogeneity of be-
tweenness distribution indicates that the excessive load is
concentrated on a few nodes; therefore, the UN, HH, and
PA networks tend to cause the load congestion against
intentional attacks. For the HL network, both B and
δB do not much increase when the nodes are removed
successively except under the DBA strategy. Even un-
der the DBA strategy, the values of B and δB for the
HL network are much smaller than those of the other
scale-free networks. Since the HL network can maintain
the homogeneity of betweenness distribution against in-
tentional attacks, it is a highly load-tolerant structure.
Although the maximum value of δB for the ER network
is larger than that for the HL network, the ER network
can maintain low value of δB longer. This means that the
distribution of betweenness centrality for the ER network
is the most homogeneous. The ER network is more load-
tolerant than the scale-free networks.
IV. DISCUSSIONS
In this study, we have found that the topological as-
sortativity strongly affects the robustness of scale-free
networks. Especially the HL network is more load-
tolerant than the other models of scale-free networks.
The average degree of the networks used in this study
is k = 2E/N = 4; therefore, the results observed here
with the HL model are applicable to the disassortative
real networks such as the Internet (k = 3.8) [22] and the
human protein interaction networks (4.624) [23]. The
common characteristic of these disassortative networks
is that there exists dynamics such as traffic and interac-
tions in the networks. In communication networks, for
example, the architectures which can avoid heavy con-
centration of traffic load are advantageous. In biological
networks, cells can robustly survive and retain their fun-
damental functional interactions under the perturbations
by intrinsic errors and extrinsic stimulations. Even if a
large number of hubs are removed, the load intensity of
the HL network does not increase excessively. Our results
indicate that the disassortative topology can avoid the
propagation of lethal perturbations caused by removal
of hubs. This advantage of load tolerance for the HL
network is not observed in the scale-free networks con-
structed with the PA model.
The HH network displays the connectivity robustness
against intentional attacks; however, the amount of load
and heterogeneity of the load distribution become ex-
tremely high. Since excessive load intensity increases the
possibility to cause the chain of node breakdowns, the
HH network is not an appropriate structure for reliable
systems. The ER network also shows the connectivity
robustness under the intentional strategies. In addition,
unlike the HH network, the degree of heterogeneity of the
load distribution is quite low even if the important nodes
are removed from the network. Although the ER net-
work has these advantages over the scale-free networks,
many real networks adopt the scale-free structures. The
common disadvantage of both the HH and ER networks
is the fragility of connectivity against random attacks
and failures. In real networks, random attacks are the
most common perturbations compared with intentional
attacks; therefore, these networks improve the connectiv-
ity robustness against random attacks with acquiring the
disassortative topology.
In the non-assortative scale-free networks, the connec-
tivity robustness of the UN network is similar to that of
the PA network, but the load tolerance of the UN net-
work is higher, as shown in Table IV and Table V. This
indicates that the topology with the positive age corre-
lation attenuates the load tolerance as in the case of the
degree-degree correlation.
The HL model does not display high load tolerance
only against the dynamic betweenness-based attack. Be-
cause it is difficult to precisely search the node with the
highest betweenness centrality without any calculations,
the DBA strategy might be rarely observed in nature.
The order of the dynamic betweenness-based attacks cor-
responds with that of the sequential node breakdowns in
the case where the network cannot withstand the heavy
load. The trigger of sequential node breakdowns seems
to be an excessive increase of load when a network is
attacked by other random or degree-based attack strate-
5gies. By suppressing the excessive load concentration
against these attacks, the disassortative topology avoids
lethal shutdown of the whole system.
V. CONCLUSION
We have studied the connectivity robustness and load
tolerance in the scale-free networks with different in-
ner structures under the random and intentional attack
strategies. We have proposed the models of scale-free
networks which can change the topological assortativ-
ity with fixing a degree distribution. To conclude, we
find that disassortative networks are structurally robust
against random attacks and highly load-tolerant while
assortative networks are most resistant to intentional at-
tacks yet significantly fragile against random attacks.
The PA model has been widely used to study the ba-
sic functionalities of real networks; however, it is clear
that this model is incomplete to account for the robust-
ness of real networks. The results presented here indicate
other functionalities of scale-free networks may depend
on the topological assortativity. In the case of analyzing
the properties of scale-free networks, their inner struc-
tures should be taken into consideration for the precise
evaluation.
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6TABLE I: Topological indices for the HL, UN, HH, PA, and ER networks (1000 nodes and 2000 edges) in the initial state: the
degree exponent γ, assortativity r, average shortest path length L, average node betweenness centrality B, node betweenness
deviation δB , and average clustering coefficient C. These values are averaged over 1000 trials, and their standard deviations
are shown in parentheses.
γ r L B δB C
HL -2.309 (0.024) -0.201 (0.025) 4.342 (0.052) 1669.184 (25.984) 5150.485 (460.308) 0.017 (0.005)
UN -2.309 (0.024) -0.056 (0.016) 4.216 (0.061) 1606.285 (30.324) 6136.614 (486.685) 0.024 (0.005)
HH -2.309 (0.024) 0.208 (0.074) 4.887 (0.110) 1941.549 (54.856) 6133.316 (665.880) 0.020 (0.003)
PA -2.309 (0.024) -0.083 (0.013) 4.047 (0.058) 1521.947 (29.105) 6543.770 (502.933) 0.029 (0.006)
ER — -0.008 (0.023) 5.315 (0.015) 2155.307 (7.642) 1725.676 (54.555) 0.003 (0.001)
TABLE II: The critical threshold fc for each network model under the RA (random attack), SDA (static degree-based attack),
SBA (static betweenness-based attack), DDA (dynamic degree-based attack), and DBA (dynamic betweenness-based attack)
strategies. These values are averaged over 1000 trials, and their standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
fc
RA SDA SBA DDA DBA
HL 0.670 (0.064) 0.155 (0.016) 0.190 (0.019) 0.138 (0.011) 0.103 (0.006)
UN 0.642 (0.104) 0.138 (0.013) 0.156 (0.017) 0.122 (0.009) 0.098 (0.006)
HH 0.469 (0.141) 0.200 (0.012) 0.212 (0.018) 0.161 (0.009) 0.137 (0.007)
PA 0.655 (0.078) 0.130 (0.011) 0.136 (0.012) 0.121 (0.009) 0.096 (0.006)
ER 0.634 (0.033) 0.352 (0.022) 0.404 (0.022) 0.273 (0.010) 0.235 (0.008)
TABLE III: The fraction fB of node removal when the average node betweenness centrality peaks under the RA (random
attack), SDA (static degree-based attack), SBA (static betweenness-based attack), DDA (dynamic degree-based attack), and
DBA (dynamic betweenness-based attack) strategies. These values are averaged over 1000 trials, and their standard deviations
are shown in parentheses.
fB
RA SDA SBA DDA DBA
HL 0.019 (0.032) 0.122 (0.022) 0.145 (0.029) 0.118 (0.015) 0.096 (0.008)
UN 0.015 (0.024) 0.088 (0.020) 0.081 (0.021) 0.090 (0.015) 0.088 (0.009)
HH 0.023 (0.031) 0.183 (0.014) 0.174 (0.022) 0.150 (0.009) 0.130 (0.008)
PA 0.026 (0.047) 0.109 (0.014) 0.116 (0.015) 0.106 (0.011) 0.090 (0.007)
ER 0.026 (0.102) 0.313 (0.025) 0.359 (0.032) 0.258 (0.011) 0.223 (0.012)
TABLE IV: The maximum value of average node betweenness centrality Bmax of the largest connected component at fB for
each network model under the RA (random attack), SDA (static degree-based attack), SBA (static betweenness-based attack),
DDA (dynamic degree-based attack), and DBA (dynamic betweenness-based attack) strategies. These values are averaged over
1000 trials, and their standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
Bmax
RA SDA SBA DDA DBA
HL 1683.334 (36.773) 3231.445 (466.164) 3155.943 (423.851) 3498.506 (516.877) 5431.222 (1135.440)
UN 1622.297 (42.248) 3328.901 (401.278) 3079.637 (264.438) 3541.010 (455.957) 5578.857 (1279.415)
HH 1961.184 (63.661) 8549.646 (1394.956) 5862.128 (886.470) 9970.531 (1714.246) 11490.158 (2404.594)
PA 1541.016 (44.647) 4471.303 (648.140) 4478.449 (636.512) 4848.303 (754.920) 6775.231 (1356.674)
ER 2162.629 (37.696) 4181.165 (557.778) 4050.177 (565.841) 5793.221 (869.380) 6745.126 (1347.186)
7TABLE V: The betweenness deviation δBfB of the largest connected component at fB shown in Table III for each network
model under the RA (random attack), SDA (static degree-based attack), SBA (static betweenness-based attack), DDA (dynamic
degree-based attack), and DBA (dynamic betweenness-based attack) strategies. These values are averaged over 1000 trials,
and their standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
δBfB
RA SDA SBA DDA DBA
HL 5051.387 (498.952) 5031.664 (1229.997) 5192.662 (1248.097) 5504.870 (1315.247) 10652.721 (3195.809)
UN 6051.705 (529.403) 6002.702 (1580.187) 5385.555 (1050.862) 6541.205 (1706.036) 12234.777 (4166.939)
HH 6014.938 (692.899) 12621.442 (3195.688) 8914.047 (2109.814) 14609.197 (3759.824) 19659.712 (5828.889)
PA 6333.455 (669.259) 7493.152 (1812.646) 7987.298 (1875.853) 8197.516 (2038.289) 13485.849 (3838.336)
ER 1798.551 (350.141) 6231.814 (1531.553) 6029.592 (1545.539) 8676.582 (2184.394) 12136.679 (3814.250)
FIG. 1: Examples of neighbor connections adjacent to a hub with the most edges in the (a) HL, (b) UN, (c) HH and (d) PA
networks. Each hub is represented as a square. Continuous color map reflects the log-scaled degree k of a node (2 ≤ k ≤ 81).
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The relative size S of the largest connected component when a fraction f of the nodes are removed
from the network under the (a) RA (random attack), (b) SDA (static degree-based attack), (c) SBA (static betweenness-based
attack), (d) DDA (dynamic degree-based attack), and (e) DBA (dynamic betweenness-based attack) strategies. Solid line
represents the HL network; dashed line, the UN network; dotted line, the HH network; dash-dotted line, the PA network; and
dash-double dotted line, the ER network. These lines are averaged over 1000 trials.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The average path length L of the largest connected component when a fraction f of the nodes are removed
from the network under the (a) RA (random attack), (b) SDA (static degree-based attack), (c) SBA (static betweenness-based
attack), (d) DDA (dynamic degree-based attack), and (e) DBA (dynamic betweenness-based attack) strategies. Solid line
represents the HL network; dashed line, the UN network; dotted line, the HH network; dash-dotted line, the PA network; and
dash-double dotted line, the ER network. These lines are averaged over 1000 trials.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) The average betweenness centrality B of the largest connected component when a fraction f of the
nodes are removed from the network under the (a) RA (random attack), (b) SDA (static degree-based attack), (c) SBA
(static betweenness-based attack), (d) DDA (dynamic degree-based attack), and (e) DBA (dynamic betweenness-based attack)
strategies. Solid line represents the HL network; dashed line, the UN network; dotted line, the HH network; dash-dotted line,
the PA network; and dash-double dotted line, the ER network. These lines are averaged over 1000 trials.
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FIG. 5: (Color online) The betweenness deviation δB of the largest connected component when a fraction f of the nodes are
removed from the network under the (a) RA (random attack), (b) SDA (static degree-based attack), (c) SBA (static betweenness-
based attack), (d) DDA (dynamic degree-based attack), and (e) DBA (dynamic betweenness-based attack) strategies. Solid
line represents the HL network; dashed line, the UN network; dotted line, the HH network; dash-dotted line, the PA network;
and dash-double dotted line, the ER network. These lines are averaged over 1000 trials.
